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In a well-known passage in his famous dissent in the flag-salute
case of 1943, Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote:
Our constant preoccupation with the constitutionality of legislation
rather than with its wisdom tends to preoccupation of the American
mind with a false value. The tendency of focussing attention on
constitutionality is to make constitutionality synonymous with wisdom,
to regard a law as all right if it is constitutional. Such an
attitude is a great enemy of liberalism. . . . Reliance for the most
precious interests of civilization, therefore, must be found outside
of their vindication in courts of law.
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In a well-known passage in his famous dissent in the flag-salute
case of 1943, Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote:
Our constant preoccupation with the constitutionality of legislation
rather than with its wisdom tends to preoccupation of the Ameri-
can mind with a false value. The tendency of focussing attention on
constitutionality is to make constitutionality synonymous with wis-
dom, to regard a law as all right if it is constitutional. Such an
attitude is a great enemy of liberalism. . . . Reliance for the most
precious interests of civilization, therefore, must be found outside
of their vindication in courts of law."
Arthur Miller does not subscribe to any such notion. For him, the prin-
cipal function of courts of law is precisely to vindicate the most pre-
cious interests of civilization. In his view, the Constitution is not a finite
set of narrow commands that establish a framework within which pol-
icy is to be determined. Rather, it is an expansive body of rules which,
at any given time, require the adoption of the specific policy choices
that would then best serve to achieve "the avowed goal of meeting cur-
rent problems. ' 2 What wisdom dictates to be the most desirable way of
attaining important social goals is what the Constitution demands.
When applied to the issue of nuclear weapons, that approach yields the
conclusion that since "the ultimate purpose of law [including constitu-
tional law] is human survival under conditions that allow human dig-
nity to be maximized" and since wisdom (indeed, common sense) tells
* Professor of Political Science, University of Massachusetts.
1. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 670-71 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
2. Miller, Nuclear Weapons and Constitutional Law, 7 NoVA L.J. 21, 27
(1982).
3. Id. at 26.
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us that the continued manufacture and deployment of nuclear weapons
involves the increasing risk that eventually, by design or error, they will
be employed and that their use would threaten the complete destruc-
tion of human civilization, the Constitution must forbid the government
of the United States from following a policy that perpetuates the possi-
bility of such a catastrophe. In addition, the Constitution must impose
a "duty [upon the government] to take action designed to eliminate the
nuclear threat throughout the world."4
Professor Miller is, of course, well aware that, despite its substan-
tial appeal (particularly to those like me who agree as to the danger
posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and the urgent
need to eliminate the threat), such a conclusion is at odds with tradi-
tional approaches to constitutional interpretation. He recognizes that
adoption of any of his points "would require creativity or innovation by
a constitutional decision-maker," and concedes it is unreasonable to
expect that they would be accepted by the Supreme Court." Indeed, the
novelty of his arguments is obvious. To Congress is delegated the power
to declare war, to raise and support armies, and to provide and main-
tain a navy. No language in the Constitution nor any judicial decision
known to me suggests that those powers do not carry with them the
power to-select the weapons with which the armies and the navy are to
be equipped. And, however much we may pray that no President would
ever again make the choice to employ atomic or nuclear weapons in
war, surely, according to the accepted understanding of the Constitu-
tion, the authority of the Commander-in-Chief includes the power to
decide which of the weapons provided by Congress are to be employed
once hostilities have commenced.7 Moreover, much more precedent can
be marshalled against, rather than for, the proposition that the Consti-
tution obligates the three branches of the national government to ob-
4. Id. at 24.
5. Id. at 29.
6. Id. at 23.
7. The power delegated to Congress to declare war obviously limits the authority
of the President to employ weapons before hostilities have commenced. See L. HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 80-81 (1972). But that limitation goes to
the use of any weapons; it has no special significance with respect to nuclear weapons,
even though it may apply with greater moral force where nuclear weapons are
concerned.
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serve and enforce norms of international law even where these are con-
trary to national law or national policy."
The fact that a constitutional lawyer would be strongly tempted to
employ constitutional argument to shape public policy on so vital an
issue is certainly understandable.9 But Professor Miller faces a serious
dilemma in that his argument is likely to be persuasive only to those
who already agree with his policy position. Those who hold opposing
views on the policy question are many and influential. They sincerely
believe, however misguidedly, that the maintenance of a nuclear arse-
nal and the willingness to employ it where necessary are absolutely es-
sential to the cause of peace and the security of our nation and its
allies, and can readily dismiss Miller's argument with the accurate ob-
servation that settled constitutional law is to the contrary. Even those
whose minds are not yet made up are unlikely to be won over by a
constitutional contention that can be rebutted so effectively by argu-
ments with impeccable traditional credentials.
If Professor Miller's purpose is simply to reinforce the resolve and
commitment of those who already agree with him on the policy ques-
tion by telling them that their views are not only supported by good
sense, ultimate morality, and perhaps the norms of international law,
but also reflect authentic constitutional commands, he may well be suc-
cessful. But if his purpose is to change public opinion through constitu-
tional argument, he must be able to convince his audience of the au-
thoritativeness of that argument, and the authoritativeness of a legal
argument can be demonstrated in only two ways: consensual agreement
8. See id. at 460-61 n.61. Professor Henkin flatly states that "the Constitution
does not forbid the President (or the Congress) to violate international law and the
courts will give effect to acts within the constitutional powers of the political branches
without regard to international law." Id. at 221-22. See Feinrider, International Law
as the Law of the Land, 7 NOVA L. J. 103 (1982) for opposing view.
9. The insightful observation of Felix Cohen seems squarely on point here:
Clearly, for the sanitary engineer, the existence of untreated swamps is the
cause of malaria. For the king's attendant with the palm-leaf fans, the bite
of the mosquito is the only relevant cause. For the pathologist, the effect of
the malaria virus upon red blood corpuscles is the cause. In each case the
cause is the point at which effort can be usefully applied.
Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238, 255 (1950). For Professor
Miller, as constitutional lawyer, the relevant cause of the nuclear weapons crisis must
be the failure to recognize and apply proper principles of constitutional law.
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among a substantial majority of those generally recognized as know-
ledgeable in the field or acceptance by a court-preferably an appellate
court and most preferably the Supreme Court. Quite plainly, Professor
Miller is in a position to make neither demonstration. Novel constitu-
tional arguments designed to win the day for the adherents of one side
of a controversial policy issue will, by their nature, be unable to com-
mand broad acceptance, and, as noted, Professor Miller concedes that
his argument will be unlikely to find judicial favor. Even a favorable
judicial ruling may, of course, be insufficient to resolve a disputed con-
stitutional issue, as long ago demonstrated by the categorical rejection
by the North of the Dred Scott decision of 1857,10 and as may clearly
be seen today in the ongoing debates over such questions as abortion
policy,11 the exclusionary rule,1 2 and school bussing for the achievement
of racial desegregation. s But the instances in which public opinion and
public policy have been changed by constitutional reasoning1 4 have nec-
essarily involved judicial pronouncements which have given moral force
to debatable constitutional arguments by converting them into rules of
law. Without such legitimation,1 5 mere argument, no matter how co-
gent and thoughtful, lacks the authority necessary to lead persons of
differing views to abandon their prior positions on policy questions.
Professor Miller is surely right in his observation that "[ilt would
be naive to expect the Supreme Court to intervene"1 on the issue of
nuclear weapons policy. But is this merely because, as he suggests,
"judges are timorous officers of government . . . [who] look upon re-
quests to go beyond the familiar and the expected as frightful occa-
10. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). For a description
and discussion of the political reaction engendered by this decision, see D.
FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE 417-567 (1978).
11. See, e.g., F. JAFFE, B. LINDHEIM & P. LEE, ABORTION POLITICS (1981); E.
RUBIN, ABORTION, POLITICS, AND THE COURTS 87-161 (1982).
12. See, e.g., S. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE (1977).
13. See, e.g., the antijudicial diatribe of L. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE
(1976).
14. The paradigm case is, of course, the effect of Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954) in ending de jure racial segregation.
15. The classic discussion of the legitimating function of the Supreme Court is in
C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 56-86 (1960).
16. Miller, supra note 2, at 36.
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sions"? 17 Is the problem really only one of judicial timidity? It does
seem severe to label as timorous a federal judiciary which has, in re-
cent years, recognized abortion as a constitutional right,18 ordered the
President of the United States to relinquish evidence that would in-
criminate him with regard to the commission of impeachable offenses,1 9
drastically curtailed the imposition of the death penalty,20 required un-
willing school boards to implement sweeping remedial plans for bring-
ing about the desegregation of public schools,2" and taken over the ad-
ministration of particular prisons or of entire prison systems in some 24
states.2 It is thus a good deal less likely that the anticipated judicial
reluctance to intervene in nuclear weapons policy is to be attributed to
the inherent timorousness of judges than to their probable views on the
proper role of courts in the governmental process and on the relation-
ship between the wisdom of a policy and its constitutionality.
This leads to the inevitable question: what is the proper relation-
ship between the wisdom of a policy and its constitutionality? Or, to
put the same question somewhat more directly, when should judges in-
sist, as a matter of constitutional law, upon the adoption of a policy
they deem wise or the rejection of a policy they deem unwise? When
should they be prepared to remove a policy issue from the political fo-
rum, where numbers count, in order to decide it in the judicial forum,
where numbers can be ignored? These issues have been exercising con-
stitutional scholars a great deal in recent years, yielding a wide variety
of answers across a spectrum that finds Arthur Miller perhaps closest
to one end23 and Raoul Berger closest to the other.24 The answers at
17. Id.
18. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
19. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
20. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). A listing of
cases in which the Supreme Court invalidated the imposition of death sentences be-
tween 1976 and May, 1980, may be found in the concurring opinion of Justice Mar-
shall in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 438 n.5 (1980).
21. See the discussion in Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 458-61
(1979).
22. For a comprehensive list of states in which courts had taken over the admin-
istration of prisons as of 1981 and of the decisions which brought these results about,
see the concurring opinion of Justice Brennan in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,
353-54 n.1 (1981).
23. See A. MILLER, TOWARD INCREASED JUDICIAL AcTivisM (1982); Miller,
791
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the very extremes of the spectrum are "never" and "whenever they
want," but both of these are unacceptable. To answer "never" is to
oblige the judiciary to treat as constitutional such policies and practices
as "separate but equal" racial segregation, gross legislative malappor-
tionment, and the maintenance of prison systems in which inmates are
confined in conditions of ghastly and barbaric inhumanity.25 To cite the
wise counsel of Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, refraining in all cases
"from passing upon the legislative judgment 'as long as the remedial
channels of the democratic process remain open and unobstructed'...
seems . . . no less than the surrender of the constitutional protection of
the liberty of small minorities to the popular will."'26
On the other hand, to answer "whenever they want" is to maintain
that judges, rather than the branches of government responsive to the
electorate, should have the ultimate authority to decide the content of
government policy - an authority which they would exercise by invok-
ing the Constitution whenever they disagreed with the manner in which
Congress or the President proposed to deal with a national problem. It
is clear that Professor Miller does not find that answer unattractive,
nor its consequences undesirable.27 Unlike Learned Hand, he would
have no misgivings about being "ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardi-
ans," 28 for he would have no doubt that Platonic Guardians could be
counted on to do better in insuring "human survival under conditions
The Case for Judicial Activism, in SUPREME COURT ACTiVISM AND RESTRAINT 167
(S. Halpern & C. Lamb eds. 1982).
24. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977). Berger's view is that judi-
cial policymaking is never legitimate, and that the only proper function of courts in
constitutional adjudication is to ascertain and faithfully (slavishly) to apply the original
intention of those who framed and ratified the constitutional provision at issue. I have
elsewhere criticized Berger's position at some length. See Alfange, Another Look at the
"Original Intent" Theory of Constitutional, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 603 (1978).
25. For a lengthy and disturbing, but not exhaustive, list of the policies and prac-
tices that would have to be constitutionally tolerated if the answer to this question were
"never," see Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703,
710-14 (1975).
26. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 605-06 (1940) (Stone, J.,
dissenting).
27. See the works cited supra note 23.
28. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958).
Nova Law Journal 7:1982 1
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that allow human dignity to be maximized"29 than would individuals
whose continuation in office depends on their attentiveness to the pres-
sures of interest-group politics. Perhaps he is right. Nevertheless, that
answer has implications that are profoundly troubling.
It is likely that Platonic Guardians would be fallible; it is certain
that judges are. 0 There is no abstract reason for believing that the
policies judges might choose, after considering the arguments of law-
yers on behalf of their clients, will in fact be wiser than the policies
enacted into law by Congress after considering the representations of
interest-group spokesmen on behalf of their constituents, or than the
policies adopted by the President after considering the counsel of his
advisers. But the argument that judges should assume authority to in-
validate laws or policies they deem unwise is rarely, if ever, based on
abstract considerations. There is no mystery as to who may be expected
to advocate or oppose that argument. Those who suspect that the dem-
ocratic political process will yield policies with which they disagree,
and that, if courts were allowed to decide, more favorable policies
would be adopted, will argue for the equation of wisdom and constitu-
tionality and for judges to protect us all from the folly of majoritarian-
ism. Those who believe that the policies the political branches are likely
to adopt will be reasonably sound, and that judicial involvement will
probably result in actions that are retrogressive and unenlightened, will
argue for the strict separation of wisdom and constitutionality and for
judges to refrain from deciding constitutional questions on the basis of
their own views of wise public policy. It is thus no coincidence that in
the period from the 1880s to the New Deal, when judicial review was
perceived as a major obstacle to the cause of social and economic re-
form, liberal opinion was united in its criticism of the courts for their
failure to respect the distinction between wisdom and constitutional-
ity.81 Similarly, the enthusiasm of liberals for judicial intervention in
29. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
30. The classic statement of this proposition is that of Justice Jackson: "We [the
Supreme Court] are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only be-
cause we are final." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
31. As Robert Jackson noted shortly after the end of this period, the "long-
smouldering intellectual revolt against the philosophy of many of the Supreme Court's
decisions [equating wisdom and constitutionality] ... was led by outspoken and
1 7:1982
7
Alfange: Wisdom, Constitutionality, and Nuclear Weapons Policy
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
policy matters that blossomed during the era of the Warren Court can
hardly be unrelated to their preference for the policies that present-day
judges can sometimes be persuaded to adopt.-2 Conversely, conserva-
tives, who once looked upon courts as a bastion for the protection of
property rights against legislative policies they abhorred, 3 have come
to see the virtue of distinguishing wisdom from constitutionality now
that they perceive that policies favored by the courts may be less to
their liking than those of the legislature.3 4 Over the years, the argu-
ment that courts should ignore the distinction between wisdom and
constitutionality by substituting their own policy choices for those of
the political branches has been made and opposed on behalf of causes
both noble and not so noble.
The belief that judges can reliably be counted on to share one's
own conception of wise public policy may be both rational and accurate
with regard to specific issues at specific times. It is a more dubious
basis, however, for a defense of judicial policymaking on all public
questions in all periods. Given the fact that there is no a priori reason
to assume that the policy choices of courts will be objectively better
than those of the legislature, or that judges, who vary widely in philoso-
phy and perspective, will consistently share one's values on public mat-
respected members of the Court itself ... [and was joined by] those in our universities
distinguished for disinterested legal scholarship ... many thoughtful conservatives and
practically all liberals and labor leadership." R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDI-
CIAL SUPREMACY V (1941).
32. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW iv-v (1978).
33. The clearest statement of this view was perhaps that of Justice Brewer:
I am firmly persuaded that the salvation of the nation, the permanence of
government of and by the people, rests upon the independence and vigor of
the judiciary. To stay the waves of popular feeling, to restrain the greedy
hand of the many from filching from the few that which they have hon-
estly acquired, and to protect in every man's possession and enjoyment, be
he rich or poor, that which he hath, demands a tribunal as strong as is
consistent with the freedom of human action and as free from all influ-
ences and suggestions other than is compassed in the thought of justice, as
can be created out of the infirmities of human nature. To that end courts
exist ....
Brewer, The Nation's Safeguard, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR Asso-
CIATION 37, 47 (1893).
34. See, e.g., Graglia, In Defense of Judicial Restraint, in SUPREME COURT AC-
TIVISM AND RESTRAINT, supra note 23, at 135-37.
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ters, it would seem difficult to argue for a broad judicial policymaking
role in all areas. Certainly even the most optimistic judicial activist
today can feel no assurance that courts, given freedom to make their
own policy choices "whenever they want," will no longer use that power
to block legislative efforts at social, political, or economic reform.3 5 To
invite judges to equate their own notions of wise policy with the re-
quirements of the Constitution, and to do so on their own terms, is to
run the risk of opening a Pandora's Box of unforeseeable content.
If an understandable basis for advocating judicial activism in all
areas of policy is difficult to perceive, it is easy to see a principled justi-
fication for an across-the-board opposition to judicial policymaking-it
seems squarely inconsistent with democratic theory. As Terrance
Sandalow has written: "Reducing the influence of politics upon govern-
mental policy is, in short, a means of reducing the influence on policy
of those whose lives are affected by it.'" The observation that judicial
policymaking is antidemocratic is, of course, not new, 37 nor has it gone
unchallenged.38 The basis of the challenge, as it is most commonly
made, is that democracy, at least in its pure form, was not the form of
government chosen by the framers of the Constitution, who, through
such means as the electoral college, the imposition of constitutional re-
35. For recent examples of transparent exercises of judicial policymaking in
which legislative efforts at social, economic, or political reform were thwarted, see, e.g.,
Buckley v. Valo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (declaring invalid, on first amendment grounds,
the critical expenditure-limitation provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1974 through which the Congress had sought to protect the integrity
of the federal election process against the kinds of abuses that came to light as a result
of the Watergate scandals); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)
(striking down, apparently on tenth amendment grounds, the extension by Congress of
the coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, to the employees
of state and local governments); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765
(1978) (striking down, on first amendment grounds, a Massachusetts law intended to
control the impact of corporate spending on referendum elections); Allied Structural
Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (striking down, on contract clause grounds,
a Minnesota law intended to protect the pension benefits of employees against the risk
of plant shutdowns prior to the establishment of their pension eligibility).
36. Sandalow, The Distrust of Politics, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 446, 459 (1981).
37. See, e.g., the discussion in A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-
23 (1962).
38. See, e.g., C. BLACK, supra note 15, at 179-81; Bishin, Judicial Review in
Democratic Theory, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1099 (1977).
83 1Nuclear Weapons Policy
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straints on certain types of majority action, and the creation of an ap-
pointed and life-tenured judiciary, sought to guarantee that the will of
the people would be held within tolerable bounds.39 Judicial review, the
argument goes, although not specifically mentioned in the Constitution,
is simply another of the checks in the constitutional framework. More-
over, since its exercise has been warmly accepted by the people, it must
be seen as having been approved by democratic choice, and thus cannot
be said to be undemocratic.40 In addition, it is claimed that the whole
argument that courts should defer to the policy judgments of the politi-
cal branches in order to respect the will of the majority is misconceived
because, even if it could be assumed that there is such a thing as the
majority will and that it is possible to ascertain in practice what that
will actually is, the political branches (particularly Congress) are se-
lected and organized in such a way as to insure its frustration, not its
effectuation.4
These challenges to the claim that judicial policymaking is an-
tidemocratic have been answered meticulously and effectively by Jesse
Choper,42 whose argument cannot even be summarized here. Suffice it
to say that, while one must concede the existence of myriad ways in
which the political branches can function undemocratically and escape
public accountability, Congress and the President remain vastly more
responsive to public opinion than the federal courts. And, while the
American people clearly favor judicial review and expect the courts to
hold the other branches of government within constitutional limits, it
requires an enormous jump to conclude from that observation that the
public would approve the courts' use of that power to invalidate presi-
dential or congressional action in any case in which the judges deemed
the policy underlying that action to be mistaken.43 While the framers
39. See id. at 1104-08.
40. C. BLACK, supra note 15, at 178-79, 210-12.
41. The best, and perhaps now the classic, statement of this argument is in M.
SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 17-25 (1966).
42. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 29-
59 (1980).
43. There is more than a little merit in the observation of Robert Bork:
The Supreme Court regularly insists that its results, and most particularly
its controversial results, do not spring from the mere will of the Justices in
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undoubtedly were uneasy about some of the possible ramifications of
majority rule and sought to guard against its potential excesses, they
did so, as Gordon Wood describes it, "without repudiating the republi-
canism and the popular basis of government that nearly all devoutly
believed in."" That the action of the people's representatives may need
to be checked from time to time and in particular ways does not render
unlimited judicial policymaking legitimate. If judges may freely substi-
tute their own policy preferences for those of the legislature, we should
no longer claim to be a democracy, and should seek to find a new name
and a new theory for the governmental system which has evolved.
If judicial policymaking-the equation of wisdom with constitu-
tionality-is sometimes imperative but not always permissible, just
when is it proper and defensible? My own choice for the proper start-
ing place in the search for the answer is Justice Stone's justly cele-
brated Carolene Products footnote of 1938."5 There Stone suggested
that the political process was the proper area for the resolution of pol-
icy questions' 6 except where effective access to it is wholly or partially
closed off to the persons affected by the policy at issue or where
"prejudice against discrete and insular minorities"' seems likely to
have been the motivation for its adoption or enforcement. In those
cases, courts may legitimately view with skepticism the results arrived
at through the political process and undertake to assess for themselves
ing of the Constitution of the United States. Value choices are attributed
to the Founding Fathers, not to the Court. The way an institution adver-
tises tells you what it thinks its customers demand.
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 3-4
(1971).
44. Wood, Democracy and the Constitution, in How DEMOCRATIC IS THE CON-
STITUTION? 1, 16 (R. Goldwin & W. Schambra eds. 1980).
45. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). It
is precisely because it uses the Carolene Products footnote as the starting place in the
search for the answer that I find J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) to be the
most pregnant and insightful of the recent writings on the legitimate role of judicial
review in a democratic society. Professor Miller is, of course, not of the same opinion.
See Miller, Book Review, 32 U. FLA. L. REv. 369 (1980).
46. Stone's view of the proper locus of policymaking authority in the ordinary
case was forcefully expressed in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1, 78-88 (1936).
47. The term comes from the third paragraph of the Carolene Products footnote,
304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
1 7:1982 85 1Nuclear Weapons Policy
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the desirability of the policy outcome.48 The thrust of Stone's Carolene
Products approach (at least the approach described in the second and
third paragraphs of the footnote) 49 may be characterized as resting
upon a "legislative failure" theory 5 ---that is, the theory that judicial
resolution of the policy questions inherent in constitutional adjudication
becomes permissible when the political process (most commonly the
legislative process) fails adequately to perform its function of attaining
a just and fair compromise among competing interests because of im-
perfect access or prejudice.
It may be that a legislative failure theory alone is insufficient to
cover all of the circumstances in which the policy judgments of the
legislature may be judicially disregarded. Institutional considerations
may undoubtedly justify a greater role for courts in the evaluation of
procedural, as opposed to substantive, rules, 51 and there should be some
48. As Stone was to write two years after Carolene Products:
History teaches us that there have been but few infringements of personal
liberty by the state which have not been justified. . . in the name of right-
eousness and the public good, and few which have not been directed...
at politically helpless minorities.
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 604 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting).
49. There is another paragraph - the first - which suggests that courts might
be justified in not accepting the policy judgments of the political branches where the
action being challenged appears to violate one of the specific prohibitions of the Consti-
tution. This paragraph was not in Justice Stone's original version of the footnote but
was added later at the urging of Chief Justice Hughes. See L. LUSKY, By WHAT
RIGHT? 108-11 (1975). It is somewhat at odds with the portion of the footnote that
Stone had conceived because it seeks to justify judicial rejection of legislative policy
judgments, not on the basis of any reason to believe that the legislative process may not
have functioned fairly, but solely on the text of the Constitution. See id. at 111-12.
Since the text is usually not self-defining, ascribing meaning to its provisions is an act
of policymaking. If, as Stone believed, courts should defer to the policy judgments of
the political branches in the ordinary case, why not in these cases as well? That is, as
long as there is no ground for suspicion that the political branches may be unjustly
disfavoring those without an effective voice in the political process or those toward
whom majoritarian prejudice may be directed.
50. It has, in fact, been so characterized by Owen Fiss. See Fiss, Foreword: The
Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6-11 (1979). Professor Fiss is extremely critical
of the Carolene Products approach because he rejects its "general presumption in favor
of majoritarianism." Id. at 6.
51. Even Justice Frankfurter, who saw no room for judicial reexamination of the
substantive policy choices of the legislature as long as these choices could be said to be
12
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room for judicial invalidation of statutes touching on individual rights
where these cannot be said'to serve any legitimate public purpose52 or
where, in the classic formulation of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, "a
rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed
would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by
the traditions of our people and our law."53 But surely the protection of
the powerless and the unrepresented from a hostile or unsympathetic
majority is manifestly the great and vital function of judicial review. It
is the fulfillment of that function that amply justifies judicial poli-
cymaking in certain situations: defending the right to hold and to ex-
press beliefs that the majority may regard as abhorrent;5' eliminating
gross legislative malapportionment 5 or discriminatory gerrymander-
ing;56 abolishing all vestiges of racial discrimination that stigmatizes its
victims; 57 taking whatever affirmative action may be required to insure
rationally related to the achievement of a proper public purpose, see, e.g., West Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 647 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting), conceded the propriety of "the exercise of judgment" by courts in the evalua-
tion of procedures employed in criminal trials "to ascertain whether they offend those
canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking
peoples." Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
52. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), invalidating Connecti-
cut's anti-contraception law. Cf. Justice Harlan's statement in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 543 (1961) (dissenting opinion), that due process forbids "all substantial arbitrary
impositions and purposeless restraints." The abortion cases, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 197 (1973), cannot be said to involve purposeless
restraints and thus present a far more difficult issue than Griswold. See, e.g., Epstein,
Substantive Due Process By Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SUPREME
COURT REvIEW 157.
53. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
54. That is, the kind of protection that the Supreme Court, to its discredit, did
not provide in the years following both World Wars. See, e.g., Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Cf. Collin v.
Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
55. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
56. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
57. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Race-conscious legislation
that does not stigmatize those who may be adversely affected is another matter. See
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 373-76 (1978) (opinion
of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.). As Laurence Tribe has noted:
"When the group in control of the political process adopts classifications which protect
or benefit a minority and burden itself, the reasons are absent for regarding the govern-
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that public school authorities meet their constitutional responsibility to
establish and maintain school systems "in which racial discrimination
would be eliminated root and branch;" 58 and guaranteeing that condi-
tions of confinement in state prisons are not so inhumane and barbaric
as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.59 At the same time, rec-
ognition that legislative failure to protect the rights of those who have
suffered from prejudice or inadequate representation provides the fun-
damental justification for judicial policymaking would spare us judicial
interference with the policy decisions of the political branches in cases
where those who seek judicial protection from the effects of those poli-
cies are themselves in command of substantial political resources and
cannot reasonably be looked upon as the targets of irrational majority
hostility.60
But under almost any theory that recognizes some limitations on
judicial discretion, it is difficult to understand how the issue of nuclear
weapons policy could be said to fall within the range of questions that
may be deemed appropriate for judicial, as opposed to political, resolu-
tion. I am not disposed to deny that the issue is one on which human
survival may ultimately depend, or that the policy of increasing our
stockpiles of missiles and warheads (while seeking to negotiate for their
overall limitation) and of maintaining a first-strike capability is one
that carries with it the terrible risk of the eradication of civilization.
mental choice with suspicion, and therefore for strictly scrutinizing the results." L.
TRIBE, suprts note 32, at 1044.
58. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968).
59. Prisoners clearly fall within the scope of both the second and third
paragraphs of Justice Stone's Carolene Products footnote (see supra text accompany-
ing note 47). They have no access to the political process and they are a "discrete and
insular" minority. They are "voteless, politically unpopular, and socially threatening."
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 358 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring).
60. Among the recent judicial excrescences that might have been avoided under
a legislative failure theory are Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (declaring invalid
the expenditure limitations in the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of
1974, even as applied to the campaigns of the Republican and Democratic candidates
for federal office - individuals who, as a group, are probably the least lacking in politi-
cal efficacy of anyone in the country); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976) (declaring invalid the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
to employees of state and local governments, in disregard of what Justice Brennan, in
dissent, described as "the enormous impact of the States' political power" when exer-
cised in the federal political process. Id. at 878 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
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But the urgency of the issue and the potentially frightful consequences
of mis'calculation are not what should determine whether the matter is
one for the political or the judicial process. In fact, recalling the obser-
vation of Terrance Sandalow, one might reasonably conclude that the
more urgent the issue, the more vital it is to avoid "reducing the influ-
ence on policy of those whose lives are affected by it." 1 Shifting the
question to the judicial forum converts it into a dispute to which most
of us become bystanders; leaving it in the political process can nurture
a sense of public responsibility-such as is currently being manifested
in the rapid growth of the grass-roots movement for a nuclear freeze.
Moreover, raising the issue in the courts carries its own risks, which
ought not to be minimized. As Charles Black has shown, judicial action
can do much to legitimize governmental policy.62 A ruling by the Su-
preme Court that the maintenance of a nuclear weapons arsenal is con-
stitutional (which is the only ruling realistically to be expected should
the question actually reach the Court and be decided on the merits)
could, in light of the public tendency noted by Justice Frankfurter "to
regard a law as all right if it is constitutional," 8 seriously undermine
the cause of opposition to nuclear weapons" by raising doubts in the
minds of many persons about the point of continuing to object to a
policy whose validity has been judicially affirmed.
Obviously, the issue of nuclear weapons policy is not one where
access to the political process is in some way closed off to those whose
interests are affected.65 Nor is it one where the government's policy is
61. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 15.
63. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
64. The legitimating function of the Supreme Court has already dealt a blow to
the opponents of nuclear power plants. Ignoring serious questions of standing in order
to reach the merits of a suit brought by groups seeking to block plant construction, the
Court gave advance validation to the Price-Anderson Act of 1957, which limits the
total amount of a company's liability in the event of a nuclear accident. As long as the
validity of the act was an open question, companies had a strong motivation for caution
in entering the nuclear power industry. The legitimation of the act took away that need
for caution and gave the companies concerned a significant stimulus to proceed. See
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
65. Of course, human survival is not a question about which only citizens of the
United States have an interest. Every person in the world may well have a life-or-death
interest in what the policy of the United States is with regard to nuclear weapons, but
891
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aimed at, or may be expected to have its harshest effects upon, a disad-
vantaged minority. If nuclear war should come, the costs will be shared
evenly by all, including the officials responsible for developing and sup-
porting the policy that may have led to it. Judicial intervention thus
cannot be justified on the basis of a theory of legislative failure. Indeed,
the issue is not, in the traditional sense, one of individual liberties at
all. For, despite the potential costs to us all, the government is not seek-
ing to deprive anyone of life, liberty, or property; it is seeking-beyond
a doubt, sincerely-to protect the nation, its people, and its allies from
a possible external threat, and, presumably, to advance the cause of
world peace through nuclear deterrence. In that regard, it cannot be
said that the government's policy is unrelated to the attainment of a
legitimate public purpose or that it is rationally insupportable. As
strongly as I believe that a policy which accepts the risk of nuclear war
is intolerable, and as easily as I may talk in private about "nuclear
madness," I would find it impossible to assert that no rational and fair
man could subscribe to the government's policy or could conscientiously
accept its assumption that the surest way of avoiding nuclear war-a
goal, I trust, that everyone shares-is to maintain a nuclear force of
sufficient strength to deter the use of such weapons by anyone else.
What is more, it is not clear what courts could do even if they
undertook to call into question the validity of the government's policy.
They could presumably hold that it is unconstitutional for the United
States to maintain nuclear weapons, but what then? Professor Miller
emphatically states that he is not advocating unilateral disarmament,
but merely urging a recognition of the government's constitutional duty
"to take action designed to eliminate the nuclear threat throughout the
world" 66 -which means, I presume, a duty to negotiate with other na-
tions to effect the abolition of nuclear weapons. Similarly, no court
could be expected to order unilateral disarmament; the most it could do
would be to order the government to enter into disarmament negotia-
tions. But I fail to see how such an order would markedly alter the
only United States citizens have direct access to the American political process. How-
ever, since the interest of all persons in survival is identical, the claims of nonresidents
of the United States may be fully represented by their counterparts among United
States citizens. This is a genuine class-action matter regardless of whether it is heard in
the political process or the judicial process.
66. Miller, supra note 2, at 24.
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existing situation. Nuclear weapons would continue to exist (and pre-
sumably, to be manufactured and deployed) during the course of
whatever negotiations would be held. The negotiations themselves
would be carried out by the President (for I doubt that even Professor
Miller is yet prepared to urge that federal courts oust the President
from the process and commence their own negotiations with foreign
governments), and would in all likelihood go on pretty much as at pre-
sent. Because any judicial declaration of the unconstitutionality of nu-
clear weapons would have no effect until the completion of successful
negotiations, it could not be expected either to cause the government to
negotiate differently than it otherwise would or to cause the public to
put greater pressure on it to conclude an agreement. The President
would be no more willing to sign a treaty except on terms that he
would consider to be fully consistent with the security interests of the
United States and the public would be no more prepared to insist that
the government accept less than the most favorable possible agreement.
Nuclear weapons are already generally perceived as abominable; yet,
as long as they are possessed by other nations, considerations of na-
tional security make the abominable seem tolerable. It is extremely
doubtful that a judicial declaration of unconstitutionality would do
more to cancel out these national security concerns than abhorrence
already does.
In sum, regardless of the magnitude of the stakes, what our nu-
clear weapons policy should be seems clearly to be a question of wis-
dom, not of constitutionality. The policy area is one where responsibil-
ity for decision making is squarely and unequivocally delegated to the
political branches by the Constitution. The soundness of the policy
raises questions about which reasonable men may differ. The hazards
that the policy generates must be faced as fully by the policymakers
themselves as by any inadequately represented or disadvantaged minor-
ity group. All of these factors point to the appropriateness of a political
resolution, as courts undoubtedly would recognize should the issue
somehow be brought before them.
It seems likely that the ultimate purpose of Professor Miller's
breathtaking exercise in constitutional reasoning is not the futile and
misdirected effort to involve the courts in the resolution of this ques-
7:1982 91 1Nuclear Weapons Policy
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tion, 7 but the generation of additional political pressure for a reversal
of current governmental policy. If that is his purpose, I wish him well.
But it is essential to remember that the horse must be kept in front of
the cart. It may well be that in some saner future, if humanity does
eventually manage to overcome the threat of nuclear devastation, it will
be the common understanding that nuclear weapons are wholly unac-
ceptable in a civilized world. That understanding may then come to be
recognized as an integral part of our constitutional law. When that
time is reached, Professor Miller's article may well be looked back
upon as the first groundbreaking step leading us to the path of higher
constitutional wisdom. But that higher constitutional wisdom will not
be achieved unless we first become convinced of the absolute necessity
of abolishing nuclear weapons as a matter of policy. Until the day has
been won on the policy question, the argument for the unconstitutional-
ity of nuclear weapons will remain a curiosity except to those who al-
ready share its underlying policy premises. It is indispensable, there-
fore, that current efforts to change national policy be directed at
persuading those who do not yet agree that continued reliance on nu-
clear weapons is unwise rather than unconstitutional.
67. It might be argued, with some merit, that the opponents of current nuclear
weapons policy have little to lose by trying to raise the issue of the constitutional merits
of that policy in the courts as well as in the political process. If they lose in the political
process, they just might win in court; on the other hand, if they win in the political
process, there is no danger that the courts would overturn that victory. It is certainly
true that courts would not overturn such a political victory as long as the traditional
limitations on judicial authority are respected. But, while fanciful, it is possible to im-
agine judges appointed by Ronald Reagan and holding the views on the scope of judi-
cial power and the concept of affirmative constitutional duty espoused by Arthur Miller
(see Miller, Toward a Concept of Constitutional Duty, 1968 SUPREME COURT REVIEW
199) who might assert that since the Constitution imposes upon the federal government
the affirmative constitutional duty to protect human dignity, and since human dignity is
only possible in a non-Communist society, the Constitution requires the United States
to maintain and deploy an arsenal of nuclear weapons sufficient to guard against the
possibility of successful Communist aggression. Why is it necessary to assume that the
policy decisions of judges will be ones that we would embrace? That was certainly not
the case prior to 1937. It is not always the case today. It need not be the case in the
future.
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